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Abstract: 
Conventionally used generic architecture of true random number generators does not allow testing of random 
numbers during their generation. This paper introduces an extension of the conventionally used generic 
architecture and describes mechanisms that can be implemented in new blocks and ensures safety increase of 
true random number generators. Objective of new architecture extension is detection of deliberate malicious 
attacks that are directed against noise source and revelation of a significant decrease of the approximate entropy 
in the subsequences of generated random number sequences. The enhanced generic architecture has been 
implemented into known software model. Obtained results show that described mechanisms allow increasing 
quality of the generated random numbers sequences. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Random number generators (RNGs) are used for 
a variety of purposes. RNGs help to ensure the 
security of cryptographic and communication systems 
by generating different session or encryption keys. 
They are commonly used in CAD (computer aided 
design) programs for modeling and simulating of 
various physical processes. For example, simulators 
of electrical circuits and elements, semiconductor 
structures or simulators of physical fields that need 
sequences of independent random numbers for some 
types of simulations. Specifically, the Monte Carlo 
simulation method is based on generating high-
quality random number sequences. RNGs are used 
during a selection of random samples from larger data 
sets and also appear in commercial applications such 
as various lottery games and gambling slot machines. 
RNGs are also very often used for measurement in 
acoustics as a source of random quantities. And not 
for measurements only, sequences of random 
numbers also appear in the arts, in music or in 
literature. Functions of many electronics devices and 
systems depend on generating of high-quality random 
number sequences. 
For higher safety, devices based on a physical 
source of randomness are incorporated into structures 
of modern systems instead of pseudo random number 
generators (PRNGs) that are based on computational 
algorithms. Generated number sequences by PRNGs 
only approximate properties of sequences of true 
random numbers. These sequences are generated by 
devices that are commonly called true random 
number generators (TRNGs) and use physical 
phenomena in which appear a random behavior, for 
example, thermal noise generated by resistors, noises 
generated in semiconductor structures [1], especially 
flicker noise and thermal noise generated by 
complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) 
structures or the jitter that arises in ring oscillators. 
However, magnitudes of these sources are very small. 
Therefore, designed TRNGs are very sensitive to 
disturbance. The basic function of TRNGs can be 
affected by sources of undesired deterministic 
phenomena. 
Any failure of the TRNG leads to total failure of 
the whole system. In the past, different variations of 
true random number generators were only presented 
in specialized cryptographic devices such as hardware 
security modules, cryptographic accelerators or smart 
carts. With the advent of modern fast computers and 
more sophisticated programs, the need for available 
high-quality random number sequences has increased. 
Gradually, TRNGs have been incorporated into more 
complex systems such as motherboard chipsets [2], 
platforms or processors [3]. 
Generally, true random number generators 
generate sequences of random numbers based on 
three different techniques. The first technique is the 
direct amplification of an analog noise [4], [5]. The 
second uses the phenomenon commonly called the 
jitter [6], [7] that arises in all digital clocked circuits 
and it is an uncertainty in the exact timing of the 
rising edge or the falling edge in a square wave 
signal. The third technique is based on metastable 
states that arise in digital circuits [8], [9]. Majority of 
the true random number generators follows a generic 
architecture that was presented in [6] and [10]. 
Safety of contemporary systems is dependent on 
the unpredictability of random numbers. Safety can 
be violated, if there is possibility that the value of 
generated numbers can be detected or affected by 
a deliberate attack. Therefore, it is important that the 
random number sequences are generated by TRNGs. 
However, these generated sequences are not tested 
and qualified by statistical test suites during 
 generation. It can be an obstacle for some 
applications of TRNGs. Above mentioned 
disadvantage is eliminated by new design of TRNG 
that allows testing of random numbers during their 
generation. 
For testing of most TRNGs and PRNGs, two 
well-known statistical test suites are used. The first 
test suite is FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements 
for Cryptographic Modules [11] (the FIPS test suite) 
and the second is A Statistical Test Suite for Random 
and Pseudorandom Number Generators for 
Cryptographic Applications [12] (the NIST test suite) 
that is very strict and is suitable for applications, 
where the strongest requirements are needed. 
A necessary condition for an implementation of 
a TRNG into modern systems is positive results of 
these test suites. 
ENHANCED GENERIC 
ARCHITECTURE 
Each true random number generator can be attacked 
by deliberate malicious attacks for a purpose to affect 
the output random number sequences. Then, these 
sequences lose random properties. Consequently, 
such attack causes a failure of security of the whole 
system. Activities that the system performs are 
threatened. Therefore, a mechanism that is able to 
detect deliberated malicious attacks must be 
incorporated into the architecture of the designed true 
random number generators. 
Except of the deliberate attacks, the loss of 
randomness is usually caused by deterministic noises, 
for example by deterministic distortion of power 
supply or of chip substrate, by regular fluctuations in 
temperature, by defects that are created during 
manufacturing of the chip of by other nonrandom 
processes. Therefore, it is also necessary to 
incorporate a block that is able to detect these 
deviations and to stop number generation.  
Partial extension of architecture of TRNGs was 
published in [10] but this paper present new complex 
extension of the generic architecture with description 
of used mechanisms. 
Conventional generic architecture 
The previously published true random number 
generators follow conventional architecture (Fig. 1) 
that was published in [6], [10] and does not allow 
testing of random numbers during their generation. 
A noise source and a digitizer form a digitized noise 
source. The noise source produces the analog noise 
signal n(t) with non-deterministic features. The 
digitized noise signal s[i] arises by sampling in the 
digitizer. 
Discrepancies in the digitized noise signal s[i] 
that arise in the noise source and in the digitizer are 
processed and corrected in the post-processing block. 
Probability distribution of the digitized noise signal 
s[i] may not be purely uniform. Therefore, statistical 
defect in generated sequences are compensated in this 
block. In the post-processing block, some types of 
lossless compression algorithms are often 
implemented due to increase randomness of 
generated sequences. The post-processing block 
produces the internal random numbers r[i]. Then in 
the output interface, the internal random numbers r[i] 
are transformed into required data format of the 
external random numbers rout[i]. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: The conventional generic architecture [6], [10] 
 
Extension of conventional architecture  
After detection of the attack, an implemented 
mechanism creates a notification that stops the output 
stream of random numbers. The notification is sent to 
the internal blocks – to the post-processing block and 
to the output interface. The designed TRNGs are able 
to notify the master control block by a message about 
the deliberate attack. Thus, the notification is 
available at output pins of the designed TRNGs. 
The attack detector works with the analog noise 
signal n(t). This is connected between the noise 
source and the digitizer and detects failures of the 
noise source. It is possible to consider a case that the 
attack affects the analog noise signal n(t). This 
disturbance of the analog noise signal n(t) cannot be 
detected after digitalization. Therefore, the attack 
detector is incorporated behind the noise source. The 
analog noise signal n(t) has known parameters but 
they will be affected during the attack. Thus, the 
detector is able to detect the malicious attack and 
creates a notification about the attack. 
The generated external random numbers rout[i] 
must be really unpredictable. In other words, the 
generated external random numbers rout[i] must meet 
the requirements of the statistical test suites in all 
cases. It means that they must have sufficient entropy 
per bit. The entropy is an important notion in the 
information theory. It expresses the degree of 
unpredictability. For example, the set of symbols is 
assumed. Symbols come independently and are 
consecutive. Maximum of the entropy occurs, when 
there is no way to predict the following symbol. The 
entropy is zero, if it is possible to determine with 
certainty the following symbol. The bases of the 
entropy were described by Claude E. Shannon in 
[13]. The Shannon entropy is defined as information 
which is produced by a process. 
 As already mentioned, the entropy per bit of the 
external random numbers rout[i] can decrease in some 
cases. This can result in loss of randomness in the 
generated number sequences. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to map the level of the entropy per bit and 
in a significant drop of the entropy per bit to create 
a message. For the design of new block which is able 
to detect low entropy per bit, the following 
consideration is used. If the entropy per bit of the 
digitized noise signal s[i] is sufficient, then the 
entropy per bit of the internal random numbers r[i] is 
also sufficient. Unpredictability of the output number 
sequences is guaranteed when the internal random 
numbers r[i] have the higher entropy per bit then 
a specified minimum entropy limit. It means that if 
the entropy per bit of the digitized noise signal s[i] is 
sufficient, then the generated external random 
numbers rout[i] are really unpredictable. 
A low entropy detector is device that is able to 
estimate the entropy per bit of the relevant generated 
signal. In this case, the low entropy detector is 
incorporated between the digitizer and the post-
processing block and processes the digitized noise 
signal s[i]. If the entropy per bit decreases under 
a certain level, then a notification is created that draw 
attention to the low level of the entropy per bit. This 
notification is sent to the post-processing block and to 
the output interface and is also available at output 
pins of the designed TRNGs for the master control 
block. The certain level of the sufficient entropy per 
bit – the low entropy threshold – is determined on the 
basis of results of the successful completion statistical 
test suites. 
The enhanced generic architecture with the 
tunable noise source is depicted in Fig. 2. The 
considered noise sources can contain tunable circuits. 
Thus, it allows changing parameters on the basis of 
requirement that is created by the low entropy 
detector. The low entropy detector must be able to 
provide information about the state of the digitized 
noise signal s[i]. 
PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS 
Currently, modern communication and cryptographic 
systems face attacks every day that threaten security 
and cause problems in life. Therefore, the new 
enhanced generic architecture is proposed and 
contains mechanisms that are able to detect the 
deliberate malicious attacks and the low entropy per 
bit of the generated random numbers. This chapter 
describes implementation of defined protective 
mechanisms. 
Attack detector 
The attack detector is based on a model when an 
offensive signal a(t) is superimposed to the analog 
noise signal n(t). This model is shown in Fig. 3. In 
normal conditions, the system produces a probability 
distribution that is changed during deliberate 
malicious attacks. In order to detect attacks, the 
probability distribution of the analog noise signal n(t) 
must be considered because any changes in the 
probability distribution of the digitized noise signal 
s[i] are unobservable. This type of attack may be 
considered the side channel attack. 
A change of the probability distribution of the 
analog noise signal n(t) is caused by the offensive 
signal a(t). But, one crucial condition must be valid. 
The standard deviation of the analog noise signal 
probability distribution must be smaller than an 
amplitude of the offensive signal a(t). This condition 
allows detecting deliberate malicious attacks. 
A similar approach is used in [10] where a detector is 
based on counting the number of samples falling 
beyond two fixed thresholds. 
 
 
Fig. 2: The enhanced generic architecture with the tunable noise source 
 
  
Fig. 3: Model of the malicious attack 
 
Low entropy detector 
The low entropy detector must determine the entropy 
of the number sequences during their generation. But, 
it is not an easy task. The definition of the Shannon 
entropy is based on the knowledge of the whole 
number sequence. Therefore, it is not possible to 
determine the value of the entropy directly from the 
Shannon definition but a way must be found how to 
estimate the entropy of generated sequences. 
The new block – the low entropy detector – 
estimates the approximate entropy of binary 
sequences that the digitized noise source produces. 
Thus, the low entropy detector processes the digitized 
noise signal s[i] that is digital and is only composed 
of logic ones and logic zeros. Under this assumption, 
an alphabet A can be introduced and A = {0, 1}. 
Then, the probability distributions are Pr(s[i]=1) = p1 
and Pr(s[i]=0) = p0 = (1-p1). According to the usual 
convention, it is defined that 0·log20 = 0. At this time, 
it is possible to use the definition of the Shannon 
entropy and obtain a relationship between the 
entropy H and the probability distribution of the 
digitized noise signal s[i] when s[i]=1. So 
 
).1(log)1(log
loglog
log)(
121121
020121
21
pppp
pppp
pppH


 
Α

 
(1) 
 
As can be seen from the formula 1, it is not 
possible to determine the exact value of the entropy 
of random number sequences that are generating. 
This is due to the fact that the probability distribution 
p1 can be varied during generation. Therefore in this 
case, an approximation of the entropy is determined 
from consecutive subsequences with fixed length. 
The subsequence is defined as g[j] = s[i+j] where 
0 ≤  j ≤  m-1 and m is number of bits of the 
subsequence. According to formula 1, periodically 
repeated sequences of ones and zeros have the 
maximal value of the entropy. However, generation 
of these sequences is absolutely impermissible. Thus, 
the approximate entropy of subsequences must be 
computed more complexly. For this reason, a method 
of the approximately entropy estimation that was 
published in [14] is adopted. Firstly, it is necessary to 
define a notion the binary derivate of the binary 
subsequence d[j]. This notion was established in [15] 
and is defined as 
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Marking d
l
[j] represents an application of d[j] 
l times. In other words, l is order of the binary 
derivate. By the application of the binary derivate, it 
is possible to detect periodically recurring patterns in 
the subsequence g[j].  
Using formula 1 it is possible to compute the 
entropy of each binary derivate of the binary 
subsequence g[j] and mark as H(p1l) where p1l is the 
probability distribution and p1l = Pr(d
l
[j]=1). For 
estimation of the approximate entropy Happrox, 
mechanism using the weighting method was 
especially developed and was presented in [14]. Thus 
the approximate entropy Happrox can be calculated as 
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where w[k] is a weighting function and n is number of 
binary derivatives. 
For application in the true random number 
generators, the suitable weighting function is 
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and this method is called as power weighting. Every 
order of the derivate has own weight and every binary 
derivative has certain value of the Shannon entropy 
according to formula 1. Higher order of the binary 
derivate has higher weight. Therefore it is possible to 
eliminate subsequences with periodic pattern. 
The highest binary derivate is not used for 
computing of the approximate entropy Happrox because 
its contribution is not essential. Therefore the first n-2 
binary derivatives of the subsequence g[j] are used 
for computation of a weighted average of the entropy 
as  
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where p1k is the probability distribution and 
p1k = Pr(d
k
[j]=1). 
The formula that is suitable for computation of 
the approximate entropy Happrox is obtained by 
substituting formulas 1 into equation 5. Then the 
partial sum of the geometrical series is applied and 
 the approximate entropy Happrox of the binary 
subsequence is 
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As written above, the thresholding method is 
used in the low entropy detector. Therefore, 
a threshold of the minimal approximate entropy of the 
binary subsequence is set. On this basis, the low 
entropy detector decides whether the subsequence is 
valid or, conversely, will be discarded. Disadvantage 
of this method of the approximate entropy 
computation is quadratic time requirements. 
ACHIEVED RESULTS 
The new blocks that are described above have been 
implemented into the software model of the TRNG 
with direct amplification of an analog noise that was 
published in [5]. Using the extended software model, 
new random number sequences have been generated 
and tested by the described statistical test suites (FIPS 
[11] and NIST [12]).  
The FIPS test suite is composed of 4 statistical 
tests and each test checks a property of the tested 
generated binary sequence. Achieved values are 
compared with the expected values for a random 
sequence that are specified by this standard. The 
tested sequence must have the length of 20000 bits. 
The NIST test suite is a package consisting of 
15 statistical tests. A variety of the different types of 
non-randomness are searched in an arbitrarily long 
sequence of generated values. This test suite is 
intended for testing TRNGs or pseudo-random 
number generators. 
New obtained results were compared with the 
published results. Let us consider the results obtained 
using the Von Neumann corrector. Clear comparison 
of the NIST tests results is shown in Table 1. All 
FIPS tests were passed. Therefore in Table 1, only 
the NIST tests are shown with an important parameter 
P-value. This important parameter indicates success 
of the relevant test and must be higher than 0.01. The 
results with symbol * are an arithmetic average of 
result set because some tests from the NIST test suite 
are composed of some subtests. Result of each type is 
successful only if all subtests are successful. For 
testing, the random sequences with the length of 
325000 bits were used. Some test could not be 
performed due of the insufficient number of random 
numbers. Results of these tests are marked as NA. 
By the Approximate Entropy Test, it is possible 
to determine the entropy of the generated sequence. 
The entropy of the published results is very high and 
its value is 0.9976 bits. However, the entropy of the 
new random sequence is 0.9998 bits. This value is 
higher because the subsequences with the low 
approximate entropy were discarded. For clarity, 
achieved values are listed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Achieved values of the entropy  
Architecture Value of the entropy (bit) 
Conventional 0.9976 
Enhanced 0.9998 
 
The obtained results show that the digitized 
noise signal s[i] can contain binary subsequences 
with the low entropy. But addition of the new 
described blocks, it is possible to prevent the spread 
into the output random number sequences and 
improve the quality of the random numbers. In other 
words, addition of the new blocks helps to increase 
safety of modern electronics systems. 
 
 
Table 1: Results obtained by the NIST tests 
 
 Conventional architecture Enhanced architecture 
 P-value Result P-value Result 
Monobit 0.0631 SUCCESS 0.9368 SUCCESS 
Frequency within block 0.4143 SUCCESS 0.4565 SUCCESS 
Runs 0.0000 FAILED 0.6344 SUCCESS 
Longest runs 0.0823 SUCCESS 0.7031 SUCCESS 
Binary matrix rank 0.5772 SUCCESS 0.2850 SUCCESS 
DFT 0.1002 SUCCESS 0.8078 SUCCESS 
Non-overlapping template 0.4593* FAILED 0.4902* FAILED 
Overlapping template 0.0105 SUCCESS 0.7012 SUCCESS 
Universal statistical  NA NA NA NA 
Linear complexity 0.4732 SUCCESS 0.1564 SUCCESS 
Serial 0.4417* SUCCESS 0.9310* SUCCESS 
Approximate entropy 0.0788 SUCCESS 0.8473 SUCCESS 
Cumulative sums 0.0907* SUCCESS 0.9441* SUCCESS 
Random excursions NA NA NA NA 
Random excursions variant NA NA NA NA 
 
 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, the new structure of the true random 
number generators that is extended with the 
protective mechanism has been shown and described. 
Implementation of the above mentioned mechanisms 
helps to increase safety of modern electronics and 
communication systems. The conventional generic 
architecture has been enhanced by the attack and the 
low entropy detectors. 
The attack detector is able to detect the 
deliberate malicious attack on the base of the forcibly 
modified probability distribution of the noise source. 
The low entropy detector is able to discarded binary 
subsequences whose the approximate entropy is too 
low. Thus, the entropy of the output random numbers 
increases. For the entropy detector the approximate 
entropy algorithm is used and is able to detect not 
only sequences with low entropy but also sequences 
with periodically recurring patterns for that the 
Shannon entropy is maximal. 
For comparison of achieved results, the NIST 
test suite has been used. The achieved results show 
that quality of the generated random numbers 
increases after extension of the conventional 
architecture by the attack detector and the low 
entropy detector. 
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